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Abstract 
This article explains that much of the hype about workforce ageing in 
Australia is either exaggerated or plainly wrong. It is true that the 
workforce is ageing, as is our society generally. However, bigger and more 
important workforce developments have occurred and are occurring. The 
increase in women's participation and changes in labour demand derived 
from effective demand are far more significant. The paper demonstrates the 
one-sidedness of the supporting arguments for a 'crisis' of workforce 
ageing. It explains that a 'cult' of early retirement is a myth and proposals 
such as raising the statutory pension and superannuation preservation ages 
are unfounded. Arguments for an ageing 'crisis' have more to do with the 
neo-liberal ideological obsession with lower government spending and, in 
particular, reduced and or 'offloaded' welfare spending. 
 
 
Introduction 
Much of the recent hype about workforce ageing in Australia is either 
exaggerated or plainly wrong. Yes, Australia's population is ageing. Certainly, 
the average age of the workforce has increased. However, closer analysis of 
labour force data reveals that the real causes of the higher average workforce 
age are shifts in workforce composition and not only population ageing per se. 
Increased labour force participation by women across all age cohorts is the 
major compositional change. The data also reveal that, in aggregate, early 
retirement is less influential than is commonly supposed. The received 
wisdom that Australia will experience a severe labour shortage in the future as 
an increasingly older workforce cascades towards early retirement is equally 
flawed. 
 
                                                 
1 Presented originally as a paper at the Social Policy Research Centre Conference 2003. 
Participants at the conference and two anonymous referees deserve thanks for their 
comments and valuable suggestions. The usual caveat applies. 
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Once the evidence is considered objectively blunt policy proposals such as 
raising the statutory pension and superannuation preservation ages lose their 
apparent urgency. Lurking behind such blunt prescriptions, however, is neo-
liberal budgetary angst over welfare commitments to a larger proportion of the 
population who will be older than 65. Ageing in Australia does not constitute 
a crisis or even a problem. Rather the phenomenon calls for thoughtful 
responses based on insight and evidence. 
 
The second section of this paper will consider the one-sidedness to which 
recent views on population and workforce ageing can succumb a 
corresponding propensity for knee-jerk policy responses. The third section will 
assess the evidence on population and workforce ageing and early retirement 
to reinforce the message of section 2. The fourth section will decompose the 
evidence on compositional changes in the Australian workforce over the past 
two decades in order to determine which are the more influential factors. 
 
In this spirit the fifth section takes a critical look at the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) population projections so that we can better evaluate claims 
that Australia will face a labour shortage in future years. The sixth section 
presents a macroeconomic model in which aggregate demand for labour 
should be considered. This model is then used to offer some alternative 
projections and a more sober assessment of possible future labour shortages. 
The seventh section, which introduces briefly the role of immigration and its 
effect on labour supply (and demand), is the penultimate section before the 
conclusion. 
 
 
Exaggeration and Simplistic Policy Responses 
Much of the writing on the subject of population and workforce ageing has an 
alarmist tone. 'Dealing with the problem' is its focus, and this establishes an 
inbuilt but unfortunate dramatic emphasis. Such an emphasis triggers what we 
might call crisis response thinking. This is unfortunate because crisis response 
policies, in our view, are not required and are likely to be counterproductive. 
The Age reported an example on 2 December 2002: 
 
The Federal Department of Finance has privately canvassed raising the age 
at which people can retire and access their superannuation to tackle the cost 
of the ageing population. An internal finance report … has argued that the 
pension age should be lifted from 65 to 70 … It also said the so-called 
preservation age at which people can access superannuation should also be 
lifted, to encourage people to work longer. (Gordon 2002)  
 The Ageing Workforce? Separating Fact from Hype 3 
 
 
Federal Treasurer Peter Costello quickly disavowed the paper, but it surely 
reflects a line of thinking. The implication of thinking that ageing is 
synonymous with 'ageing problem' or 'ageing crisis' is that people are more 
inclined to present blunt instruments as policy responses. Moreover it is a 
short step from seeing ageing as a problem to seeing older workers as the 
problem and, therefore, at whom the blunt instruments are directed (see eg, the 
emphasis in CPP 2002, p. 5). This policy cast then inevitably entrenches 
conflicting positions and engenders misleading arguments over trade-offs. 
 
One such supposed trade-off – that of younger versus older workers' jobs - has 
not been a major preoccupation in the recent Australian literature. However, it 
is discussed overseas (see eg, Auer & Fortuny 2000; ILO 2002a, pp. 3-5; 
2002b, p. 7; Spieza 2002), and it relates an important earlier dynamic that 
operated both internationally and in Australia. 'Given the shortage of jobs in 
the labour market', according to Auer and Fortuny, 'it is commonly believed 
that the old should make room for the young'. Early retirement was therefore 
encouraged 'in the hope that it [could] improve job prospects for the young 
unemployed. Nevertheless, as A. Sen noted in his address to the International 
Labour Conference [Sen 2000] … whether young and older workers are 
substitutes remains doubtful' (2000, pp. 23-24). The reasons are that 'entry and 
exit flows in the labour market' do not usually occur in the 'same sectors, 
companies or occupations' (Auer & Fortuny 2000, p. 24). 
 
What the fact of 'out of phase' entry and exit flows also points to is an inherent 
problem with unthinking responses such as raising the statutory retirement age 
as a 'solution' to a presumed 'early retirement crisis'. That is, it is likely to 
affect the segment of the labour force that would continue working until the 
current statutory age of 65 but not the segments that may be voluntarily 
leaving the labour force at ages 55-60 or that are forced into involuntary early 
retirement by unemployment, restructuring, downsizing and retrenchment. 
Indeed the focus needs to be elsewhere than the statutory retirement age if 
early retirement – voluntary, involuntary and pseudo-voluntary - is deemed a 
problem (cf. Spieza 2002, p. 96). 
 
An interesting set of exchanges occurred on the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission's (ABC) 7.30 Report of 27 November 2002. Presenter Kerry 
O'Brien (2002) introduced the segment 'Early retirement an expensive dream 
for nation' and remarked on Prime Minister John Howard's call for Australians 
to work longer. O'Brien suggested that 'many people have no choice' and that 
those who are jobless over age 45 find it 'often near impossible to find another. 
It seems that the country's employers are still firmly of the view that younger 
is better.' Howard had argued the previous week that 'the cult of early 
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retirement', as he called it, 'that we encouraged so enthusiastically as a 
community a generation ago should be changed' (Howard 2002). 
 
Veronica Sheen of the Australian Council on the Ageing quickly objected 'to 
the notion of a cult of early retirement. Most early retirement is involuntary', 
she said, 'it is not a matter of choice for older workers. It is something imposed 
because they have no alternative in today's labour market.' (Sheen 2002) 
Interestingly Minister for Ageing Kevin Andrews tended to agree with Sheen: 
 
Often human resource managers seem to look at the way in which they go 
about their hiring and firing practices through a focal point that says if 
you're between say, 25 and 35, you're in line to get a job, but if you're over 
45, you're in line to lose a job. We have to turn that around. (Andrews 
2002) 
 
The mindset that Andrews identifies is one that will reappear throughout this 
study. It is neither uncharacteristic nor is it fading with society's growing 
awareness of issues about ageing. 
 
 
Facts about Workforce Ageing and Early Retirement 
It is especially important in this light to establish the facts about population 
ageing, labour force ageing and early retirement. It will help in thinking more 
clearly about policy options and to evaluate the pervasive claims we hear 
about the population ageing, labour force ageing and early retirement. Table 1 
and Charts 1-7 summarise the main data. 
 
Chart 1 demonstrates that the population is ageing. The average age in 1982 
was 32.5; it was 36.2 in October 2002 (ABS Cat. 3201.0).2 The average age of 
the nominal working age population (ie, 15-64) was 35.9; it is now 37.8. The 
chart shows that there are proportionately fewer people in the younger age 
groups. The birth rate in 1.94 was 1982; it is now about 1.75 (ABS Cat. 
3105.0). This is an important contributor to the rise in the mean age of the 
population. The chart also shows that there are proportionately fewer people in 
the 25-34 age group and proportionately more in that of 35-59. As the baby 
boom generation3 travels through life it also travels through the data cohorts. It 
currently bulks large in the 45-54 age group. Beyond this cohort, however, all 
 
2 Data here are our calculations based on the ABS data series identified. 
3 The ABS defines the baby boom generation as Australian residents who were born in 
Australia or overseas during the years 1946 to 1965. 
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differences between 1982 and 2002 diminish in importance, except in the 65+ 
group. 
 
A significant factor here is the increase in life expectancy (declining death 
rates). Life expectancy in 1981 was 71 for males and 78 for females; the ages 
now are 77 for males and 82 for females (ABS Cat. 3302.0). The ABS 
anticipates that the birth rate will stabilise at about 1.75, but life expectancy 
will increase by 5-7 years over the next 50 years, raising the median age to 
about 42-43. Hence the population proportions for the 65+ cohort rise sharply 
for both the 2016 and 2051 projections shown in Chart 1.4 
 
Similar overall trends exist when we examine the Australian labour force, but 
there are differences, and these differences are significant. The average age of 
the nominal working age labour force (ie, aged 15-64) has increased. In 1982 
it was 35.3, but it is now 37.6 (October 2002, ABS Cat. 6202.0).5 This is one 
factor affecting the changing composition of the workforce. Age group 
percentages of 'males', 'females' and 'persons' in the labour force (Charts 2-4) 
give a more comprehensive perspective. First they demonstrate the strong 
influence at the younger end of the distribution of the trend for young women 
and men to remain in education longer. That is, there is a downward shift from 
1982 to 2002. Second the baby boom cohort is ageing, and this effect registers 
as a decrease in the proportion of the labour force of those in the 25-34 cohort 
(shift downward) and an increase in the 35-44 and 45-54 cohorts (shift 
upward). Third the proportion of women employed shown for each cohort 
older than age 25 increases dramatically. 
 
 
4 Readers should refer to comments on use of ABS labour force and population projections in 
section 6 below. 
5 The figures are slightly higher if we include those who are 65+ and still working. 
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Chart 1: Working Age population 1982-2051 by Age, Australia (%) 
 
 
 
 The Ageing Workforce? Separating Fact from Hype 7 
 
 
Table 1: Labour force and population by age and gender, Australia 
(%) 
 
 
15-19 
% 
20-24 
% 
25-34 
% 
35-44
% 
45-54
% 
55-59
% 
60-64
% 
65+
% 
Total 
% 
Proportion of total labour force: actual and projected* 
1982 
Females 5.6 6.3 8.8 7.1 5.2 1.5 0.6 0.3 35.4 
Males 6.3 8.9 17.6 13.9 10.4 4.4 2.2 0.9 64.6 
Persons 11.9 15.2 26.4 21.0 15.6 6.0 2.8 1.2 100.0 
2002 
Females 3.8 5.3 10.4 11.1 9.7 2.4 0.8 0.4 44.0 
Males 4.0 6.1 13.4 13.6 11.9 4.0 2.0 1.1 56.0 
Persons 7.9 11.4 23.8 24.7 21.5 6.4 2.8 1.5 100.0 
2016* 
Persons 6.9 11.0 22.4 22.5 22.4 8.5 4.3 2.1 100.0 
Participation rates: actual and projected* 
1982 
Females 59.6 70.9 53.4 58.5 49.3 28.0 11.0 2.4 44.6 
Males 65.0 90.9 95.6 95.1 90.7 80.1 48.1 9.7 77.4 
Persons 62.4 80.9 74.5 77.0 70.4 54.1 28.8 5.4 60.8 
2002 
Females 59.9 77.8 72.1 72.6 74.3 50.4 24.9 3.5 56.3 
Males 58.3 86.5 91.6 91.3 88.1 73.6 49.1 9.9 72.4 
Persons 59.1 82.2 81.8 81.9 81.2 62.1 37.1 6.3 64.2 
2016* 
Persons 55.4 82.0 82.5 83.2 81.5 63.1 35.7 6.5 60.6 
Civilian population 15+ persons ('000): actual and projected* 
1979 11.2 11.5 21.6 17.2 13.2 6.5 5.6 13.2 100.0 
2002 8.7 9.0 18.6 18.8 17.0 7.0 5.3 15.7 100.0 
2016* 7.5 8.1 16.5 16.8 16.6 8.0 7.1 19.5 100.0 
2051* 6.6 7.1 14.4 14.5 14.4 7.2 7.0 28.8 100.0 
 
Sources: ABS (Cats 6260.0, 6202.0, 3222.0) 
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Chart 2: Male Labour Force 1982-2002 by Age, Australia (%) 
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Chart 3: Female Labour Force 1982-2002 by Age, Australia (%) 
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Chart 4: Labour Force 1982-2016 by Age, Australia (%) 
 
 
Causes of Change in the Australian Workforce Age Profile 
Four effects emerge from the data above. First is the 'educational effect', 
which operates in the 15-19 and 20-24 age cohorts. People are staying at 
school longer and then going on to tertiary education, both higher education in 
the universities and vocational and other study in the vocational and technical 
education (VET) sector. Second is the 'baby boom effect', which operates in 
the 34-44 and 45-54 age cohorts. Third is the 'early retirement effect', which 
operates in the 55-59 and 60-64 age cohorts. Finally there is the 'participation 
effect', which captures the relative shifts in the proportions of females and 
males in all age cohorts. This section will explore which effects are the 
stronger and which are the weaker. 
 
It is important for readers to note that the cohorts are not equally sized. The 
first two and the last two are five year cohorts, while the three 'prime working 
age' cohorts in the middle are 10 year cohorts. This is the way that the ABS 
summarises the data and, though it might be better were all to span five years, 
we are to some degree stuck with it. This data presentation problem in part 
explains the extent of the peaks in the charts above. Of course, these peaks are 
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also partly explained by the 10 year cohorts embracing the prime working 
years. Alas we are also stuck with this designation, despite its pejorative tenor. 
We do not have data that tell us the rates at which men and women in each 
cohort join and leave the workforce, and why. Thus it is not possible to 
distinguish precisely changes in participation from a given year to another 
(educational, male versus female and early retirement) from changes in 
transition (eg, baby boom) as people graduate from one to other cohorts as 
they age. Hence we are forced to make some assumptions.  
 
An admittedly crude assumption will be made that the male data are a 
reasonable proxy for the 'educational' (15-19 and 20-24), 'baby boom' (34-44 
and 45-54) and 'early retirement' (55-59 and 60-64) effects for both men and 
women in the relevant cohorts. In this way we can then isolate the assumed 
effects of increased female versus male participation in the labour force 
(including non-baby boom transition effects).6 The data here track the changes 
in the respective proportions across the 20 years from 1982 to 2002. 
 
Table 2 gives an initial comparison by showing the percent change in the 
proportions in each cohort from 1982 to 2002 for both 'males' and 'females' by 
subtracting the 1982 data from the 2002 data shown in the first rows of Table 
1 above. These will add to the percent change for 'persons' in each cohort. We 
can estimate the educational, baby boom and early retirement effects by taking 
three steps. The first step is to multiply the females 1982 data in Table 1 by 
one plus the proportionate change between 1982 and 2002 in the males data. 
We had obtained the proportionate increase or decrease for males (ie, the data 
at row 3 of Table 2) by dividing the 2002 data by the 1982 data in Table 1 and 
then subtracting one. 
 
Now, on the assumption that the males data are a reasonable proxy for the 
educational, baby boom and early retirement effects for both men and women, 
increasing or decreasing the females 1982 data by the males proportionate 
change will give a reasonable approximation of these effects for females from 
1982 to 2002. In other words the difference between the original 1982 data for 
females and this new data will comprise the assumed educational, baby boom 
and early retirement effects for women. The results of this second step are 
shown at row 4 of Table 2. 
 
 
6 The word versus applies here not because of trade-offs but because we are comparing 
percentages of the sum of two components (males and females). When one goes up the 
other must go down. 
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If we then add the data at row 4 of Table 2 to the change for males we get the 
total (or persons) educational, baby boom and retirement effects for the 
relevant cohorts. The third step is to isolate the assumed change for females 
caused by increases in female labour force participation. This is simply the 
female change less the assumed educational and baby boom effects for 
females (ie, row 2 less row 4). 
 
 
Table 2: Education, Baby Boom, Early Retirement and Female 
Participation Effects on the Labour Force by Age 1982-
2002, Australia 
 
Item % change 2002 - 1982 
 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Total 
1  Male change (assumed 
education/baby boom/early 
retirement effects) – from Table 1 
-2.3 -2.8 -4.2 -0.3 1.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -8.6 
2  Females change (includes female 
education/baby boom/early 
retirement effects) – from Table 1 
-1.8 -1.0 1.6 4.0 4.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 8.6 
3  Males (education/baby 
boom/early retirement effects) 
proportionate change – from 
Table 1 = (2002/1982)-1 
-0.36 -0.32 -0.24 -0.02 0.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.19 -0.13 
4  Proportionate females 
education/baby boom/early 
retirement change 
 = (Table 1 1982 x (1 + row 3 data) 
less original 1982 data) 
-2.0 -2.0 -2.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -4.7 
5  Total education/baby boom/early 
retirement effect = (rows 1 + 4) 
-4.3 -4.8 -6.2 -0.5 2.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -13.3 
6  Assumed females participation 
effect change = (rows 2 – 4) 
0.3 1.0 3.7 4.2 3.7 1.1 0.3 0.0 13.3 
7  Total (persons) change = (rows 5 
+ 6) = (rows 1 + 2) note rounding 
-4.0 -3.8 -2.5 3.7 5.9 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.0 
 
Sources: ABS (Cats 6260.0, 6202.0, 3222.0) 
 
 
Though the estimates in Table 2 are rough, they consolidate a number of 
inferences that are suggested by Charts 2-4. First they show that the education 
effect (people staying in education longer) are the strongest effects in the 15-
24 cohorts, as shown by the figures in bold.7 Note that female participation is 
                                                 
7 The strongest influences are shown in bold and by shading. 
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also increasing in the 20-24 cohort, thus reducing the education effect by 1 
percent. Second the next cohort (25-34) experiences the baby boom effect in 
reverse. That is, the strong decline of 6.8 percent reflects its exodus, but this is 
offset by a strong rise of 3.7 percent due to the female participation effect. 
Third the next two cohorts are those in which we might expect to observe the 
baby boom effect most strongly. In fact the female participation effect is 
stronger, as it is also in the 55-59 and 60-64 cohorts. These cohorts have not 
experienced the force of the baby boom, which begins with those born in 
1946. Therefore they should capture any aggregate early retirement trend. 
There is some early retirement effect, but it is outweighed by the rise in female 
participation. This is not to say that some firms, industries and occupations are 
not affected by early retirement (eg, education and teaching), but it does mean 
that the extravagant claims about early retirement from the labour force as a 
whole are likely to be wrong. 
 
A recent Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin assessment of 'The changing 
composition of the Australian workforce' comes to the same conclusion: 
 
The changing demographic and economic structure of Australia has 
substantially altered the composition of the workforce over the past two 
decades … The strong rise in female employment has been associated with 
an overall increase in the employment to population ratio since 1980. 
Another reason for the increase in the aggregate employment to population 
ratio is that the large baby-boomer cohort has been moving into the high-
participation prime-age group over the past 20 years. However, this effect 
appears to have been relatively small … [and] an offsetting effect is that 
females in this cohort have, in aggregate, had a stronger attachment to the 
labour force than in earlier generations, and this might translate into higher 
employment shares as this cohort ages. (Babb and Parlett 2002, pp. 17-18; 
emphasis added) 
 
What this says, in addition to dampening fears about the level of early 
retirement, is that talk about the labour force ageing per se is misleading. Yes, 
the proportions in the 35-54 range are increasing, as is the average age. 
However, these results have more to do with increasing female participation 
and people staying in education longer than they do with ageing. The ABS 
predicts that in 2016 there will be higher proportions in the older cohorts. This 
itself contradicts the aggregate early retirement hypothesis. Moreover, as 
Chart 4 demonstrates, the effects are not immense: certainly not when 
compared with the increases in female participation over the years shown. Nor 
is it a problem. Increased longevity implies better health. In 2016 employees 
in the 55+ range will be physically more able to continue working than were 
their forebears. The real issue is whether they will want to continue. If so the 
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problems turn on whether they will be adequately trained and if appropriate 
social and work organisation mechanisms will exist to cater for their needs. 
 
Charts 5-7 reinforce these conclusions and begin to suggest what might really 
be fostering the current explosion of interest in the ageing of the Australian 
and OECD populations. These charts depict labour force participation rates: ie, 
the proportion of the relevant civilian population 15 and older that is in the 
labour force (employed and unemployed, essentially). The participation rate 
for males declines from 1982 to 2002 (Chart 5), but the reason is explained by 
the ABS to be partly a statistical artefact: 
 
… labour force participation rates for men are projected to fall in every age 
group except for those aged 60 and over. The projected male participation 
rate is influenced heavily by the changing age structure of the population. 
The projected decline in the participation rate from 73% in 1998 to 67% in 
2016 reflects the substantially higher proportion of the male population 
aged 65 and over, together with a substantial fall in the proportion of males 
aged 25-44 years. (ABS Cat. no. 6203.0, 1999) 
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Chart 5: Male Labour Force Participation Rates 1982-2002 by Age, 
Australia (%) 
 
 
Meanwhile the participation rate for females rises from 1982 to 2002 across 
the key cohorts (Chart 6). This in turn offsets the decline for males and causes 
the overall increase for persons shown in Chart 7. Perhaps more remarkable, 
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given the concerns often expressed, is that the projected 2016 labour force 
participation rate for persons (Chart 7) is almost indistinguishable from those 
at present. Again this counsels us against listening to the fashionable but 
extravagant claims we sometimes hear about ageing that are translated 
indiscriminately to the labour force. 
 
One more possibility must be considered before we can dismiss the early 
retirement hypothesis entirely. This is that employees are moving, 
involuntarily and voluntarily, into early retirement and then re-entering the 
labour force to work part time. Part-time work has increased in the past 20 
years, as the Reserve Bank of Australia article above noted. Chart 8 offers the 
line of best fit trends in the ratio of total employment (full and part time) to 
full-time work for males, females and persons for 1982-2002. An upward 
trend means that part-time work has increased as a proportion of total 
employment. As can be seen there is a slight increase for males but strong 
increases for females and persons. This says that the increase in female labour 
force participation has included a large part-time component. 
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Chart 6: Female Labour Force Participation Rates 1982-2002, by 
Age Australia (%) 
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Chart 7: Labour Force Participation Rates 1982-2016, by Age 
Australia (%) 
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Chart 8: Ratios of Total Employment to Full-Time Employment 
1982-2002 by Gender, Australia (%) 
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Chart 9 summarises the overall effects over the past 20 years. It shows the 
percentage of the total labour force of each age group for persons for each of 
these years, with the years 1982 and 2002 in bold. This chart also shows that 
cyclical forces are at work. These embody deeper economic trends and effects 
of the country's overall economic performance on the labour force. Thus 
Chart 9 reflects both demographic and economic factors. The education and 
female participation effects are very clear. So also is a decline from 1982 to 
1992 in the 55-59 cohort, which gives some support to the involuntary 
retirement hypothesis because this was at the depth of the last recession, and 
considerable job shedding occurred during this period. Notable, however, is 
the rise from 1992 towards 2002. 
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Chart 9: Labour Force 1982-2002 for Each Year by Age, Australia 
(%) 
 
 
Labour Force Projections and Ageing 
Will Australia face an aggregate labour shortage in future years? Will rising 
female participation rates plateau as we head towards the year 2016? The 
initial focus will be exclusively on the first question. The second will come up 
at an appropriate time in the explanation. The first answer will be relatively 
straightforward, although the underlying economic issues are more complex. 
The regrettable fact is that there is no simple answer. Moreover, when the 
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future is at issue, it is all too easy to muddle the question, as well as the 
answer, and end up answering something quite different. Let us start then by 
clarifying the question. 
 
The real question is an economic, social and political one. It is neither a 
statistical nor an econometric question. The question cannot be answered 
simply by opting to project past figures for economic growth less labour 
productivity into the future and then to assume we have obtained a reasonable 
proxy for the growth in labour demand.8 Nor can we simply use Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) labour force and population time series to forecast 
labour supply in future years, though in some situations it is reasonable to do 
so. Indeed the ABS itself does so with its labour force projections: 
 
This article [Labour Force Projections: 1999-2016] presents projections of 
the Australian labour force to 2016. These projections show the outcome 
for the labour force of extrapolating historic trends in labour force 
participation rates into the future, and applying them to projections of the 
population. (ABS Cat. no. 6203.0, October 1999) 
 
However, the ABS also warns us not to think of the projections as being much 
more than conditional statements: 
 
These projections are not forecasts, as they take no account of expected or 
likely changes in economic conditions or working patterns. (ABS Cat. no. 
6203.0, October 1999) 
 
The projections are merely extrapolations based on population growth 
projections and historic labour force participation rates. They are based on 
past data and judgements derived from circumstances that may or may not be 
replicated in the future. They are conditionals: if past labour force participation 
rate trends may be used … if population birth, death and migration rate 
assumptions are well grounded … if the regression model used to extrapolate 
the data is reasonable … if other assumptions and choices are appropriate … 
if …  
 
In fact a closer inspection of the technical appendices and arguments 
surrounding Labour Force Projections: 1999-2016 shows the projections to be 
the outcome of the following choices: 
 
1 to use in some but not all age cohorts a 'logistic' regression equation to 
extrapolate future from past participation rates; 
 
8 The precise meaning of this sentence will become clear later in this paper. 
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2 to use 1978 to 1999 participation rate data for the regressions (not 
another set of years); and 
 
3 to use so-called Series II (medium growth) population projections, 
namely to assume a high level of fertility (1.75 babies per woman), low 
level of net migration (70,000 per annum) and continued decrease in 
mortality at the current rate. 
 
Alternatives were possible. For (1) the ABS might have used straight-line 
regression or some other best fit equation, averages or even the most recent 
years' average data. For (2) they might have opted for 1990s data only, or they 
might have chosen to use smoothed data to moderate the effects of the two 
severe downturns included in their set. For (3) the ABS might have used 
Series I (higher growth) or Series III (lower growth). On the alternatives here 
alone 44 more options might have been presented to us.9 
 
The argument is not over the ABS's choices. They may well have been sound 
when adopted in 1999. The argument is that we must be aware 
methodologically of two facts about the projections. First, by their nature, they 
inevitably are highly dependent on historic data and the assumptions (choices) 
made about how to project the past into the future. Second, while the ABS 
labour force projections are useful for being what they are, they do not answer 
the question posed at the start. That is, they answer different questions: what 
might the labour force be like years from now given x, y and z? They do not, 
by themselves, answer whether Australia will face an aggregate labour 
shortage in future years because they do not intend to. 
 
The labour force projections merely define, given the assumptions used, what 
we might call a possible labour supply constraint. They do not answer the 
question posed at the start precisely for the reasons the ABS states: they ignore 
'expected or likely changes in economic conditions or working patterns'. Being 
what they are, however, they can help us to answer other questions. For 
instance, the ABS demonstrates that: 
 
Changes in participation rates, and the components of population growth 
(birth and death rate and overseas migration levels) will have a relatively 
small impact on the future labour force. The bulk of the labour force in 
2016 will be made up of people who are currently alive and in Australia. 
The size and age distribution of the current Australian population is the 
most important factor in determining the size and age distribution of the 
labour force in 2016. As the population ages, population growth will slow. 
 
9 Based on a 5 x 3 x 3 set of choices for (a), (b) and (c). 
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While the likely slowing in labour force growth could be moderated by 
rises in immigration or labour force participation, any increase in these 
components is unlikely to be large enough to prevent slower growth in the 
labour force, compared with historical levels. (ABS Cat. no. 6203.0, 
October 1999; emphasis added) 
 
The italicised sentence is doubtless the main argument. It suggests that it is 
reasonable to use the labour force projections for broad comparisons. The past 
actually does weigh heavily on the future. The reason is that the existing mass 
of the labour force, and its distribution through age cohorts, dominates other 
factors as it plods inexorably through cohorts towards retirement. Broadly it 
suggests that we can use the ABS projections to compare now and 'then' 
because possible changes in participation rates, broadly speaking, will not 
have large effects on workforce totals. 
 
This proposition can be tested. Table 3 gives the current 2002 data and the 
2016 projection calculated with the proposed cohort participation rates 
estimated by the ABS. Overall the labour force will grow by 15.5 percent, 
with the greatest proportionate growth being in the older cohorts because of 
population ageing. Table 4 uses the average 2002 cohort participation rates as 
proxies for the 2016 rates (ie, it assumes that nothing will change). This has 
the labour force grow by 14.1 percent. The difference in the absolute size of 
the labour force between Tables 3 and 4 is not large (10,842,300–10,793,200 
= 49,100), and the proportions in each cohort are close. 
 
 
Table 3: Labour Force Projections using ABS 2016 Participation 
Rates 
 
Persons Number (000) 15-20 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Total 
Labour force 2002  678.5 1026.3 2221.5 2283.0 2087.2 651.6 293.9 148.6 9390.6
Projected participation rates 2016 (%) 55.4 82.0 82.5 83.2 81.5 63.1 35.7 6.5 60.5
Projected 15+ population 2016*  1355.2 1450.5 2940.6 2928.2 2976.9 1453.9 1310.1 3515.4 17930.2
Projected labour force 2016  750.8 1189.4 2426.0 2436.3 2426.2 917.4 467.7 228.5 10842.3
Percent labour force change 2002-2016 10.7 15.9 9.2 6.7 16.2 40.8 59.1 53.8 15.5
Percent labour force 2002 7.2 10.9 23.7 24.3 22.2 6.9 3.1 1.6 100.0
Percent labour force 2016 6.9 11.0 22.4 22.5 22.4 8.5 4.3 2.1 100.0
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Table 4: Labour Force Projections using ABS 2002 Actual 
Participation Rates 
 
Persons Number (000) 15-20 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Total
Labour force 2002  678.5 1026.3 2221.5 2283.0 2087.2 651.6 293.9 148.6 9390.6
Projected participation rates 2016 (%) 58.7 81.2 81.0 81.2 80.2 61.9 36.5 6.3 59.8
Projected 15+ population 2016*  1355.2 1450.5 2940.6 2928.2 2976.9 1453.9 1310.1 3515.4 17930.2
Projected labour force 2016  795.6 1177.5 2381.9 2377.2 2386.4 900.1 478.1 221.5 10718.3
Percent labour force change 2002-2016 17.3 14.7 7.2 4.1 14.3 38.1 62.7 49.0 14.1
Percent labour force 2002 7.2 10.9 23.7 24.3 22.2 6.9 3.1 1.6 100.0
Percent labour force 2016 7.4 11.0 22.2 22.2 22.3 8.4 4.5 2.1 100.0
 
 
However, what if we alter the participation rates more dramatically? For 
example, what if we assume that female participation rates do not plateau 
towards 2016? The ABS does have female participation rates plateau, and this 
supposed effect is implicit in the rates used in Table 3. Of course, we have 
now begun to consider the second question posed at the start of this section. 
For the sake of argument suppose that female participation rates have equalled 
the ABS projected male rates by 2016, an obvious exaggeration that we have 
no reason to think will eventuate. Table 5 contains the results. 
 
Here the difference is substantial: the 2016 Australian labour force is 1 million 
or thereabouts larger than in the ABS scenario. Again, however, the cohort 
proportions are close. Note that the divergence in projections is caused entirely 
by the change in female participation because the same 2016 male cohort 
participation rates, as used by the ABS, have been used here. It is appropriate 
then to enquire as to how the ABS comes up with its projected female 
participation rates (and the plateau effect). The answer is simple: the 'plateau 
effect' participation rates are solely due to the form of equation used to fit past 
female participation data (ABS Cat no. 6260.0, pp. 24-25, 33). This form of 
regression is predisposed to projecting a plateau, given the data to which it is 
fitted, as can be seen clearly from the best fit charts the ABS presents (ABS 
Cat. no. 6203.0, October 1999). 
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Table 5: Labour Force Projections Assuming Equal Male and 
Female Participation Rates in 2016 
 
Persons Number (000) 15-20 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ Total
Labour force 2002  678.5 1026.3 2221.5 2283.0 2087.2 651.6 293.9 148.6 9390.6
Projected participation rates 2016 (%) 55.4 84.7 90.4 89.8 86.5 70.7 47.7 10.9 66.2
Projected 15+ population 2016*  1355.2 1450.5 2940.6 2928.2 2976.9 1453.9 1310.1 3515.4 17930.2
Projected labour force 2016  750.8 1228.6 2658.3 2629.6 2575.0 1027.9 624.9 383.2 11878.3
Percent labour force change 2002-2016 10.7 19.7 19.7 15.2 23.4 57.7 112.6 157.9 26.5
Percent labour force 2002 7.2 10.9 23.7 24.3 22.2 6.9 3.1 1.6 100.0
Percent labour force 2016 6.3 10.3 22.4 22.1 21.7 8.7 5.3 3.2 100.0
 
 
The ABS might be right, but there are grounds for thinking that they make a 
methodological error by using past cohort data to estimate future cohort data. 
Perhaps the error is not so important for men, but for women it could present 
serious problems. Consider what the regression method is doing in reality. It is 
suggesting, for example, that the behaviour of women in the 35-54 age cohort 
in the past 20 years can be used to predict the behaviour of women in the 35-
54 cohort in the 20 subsequent years. However, the women in the 35-54 cohort 
in the period to 2016 were in the 15-34 cohort in the past 20 years. The 
women in the 35-54 cohort in the past 20 years will be in the 55-74 age group 
in the period to 2016. The point is that these are different groups of women. 
How sensible is it in times of changing attitudes and behaviours to use the 
older group to predict the behaviour of the younger group in the future? 
Certainly the younger group's attitudes towards work will partly depend on 
their age, and in this they will follow to some degree those who went before 
them. However, it is also true that we are witnessing generational change in 
attitudes. Younger women do have a stronger expectation of workforce 
participation. Indeed the ABS population projections, which include a lower 
birth rate than in the past, are partly shaped by this recognition. 
 
 
A Simple Model for Aggregate Labour Demand 
Understanding the limits of projections based on regression modelling using 
past data brings the argument back to the original questions of labour supply, 
demand and whether Australia will face an aggregate labour shortage into the 
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future. Let us shift focus for a while to the problem of labour demand. 
Traditional or neo-classical labour demand models have it that the level of 
labour demand is a function, at the margin, of the real wage rate and labour 
productivity. These models in labour economics, whatever one might think of 
their efficacy, are not especially relevant here. The reason is that they are 
comparative static models. They are 'point in time' rather than 'over time' 
models. The level of aggregate labour demand should instead be treated as a 
derived function of the rate of economic growth and the rate of growth in 
labour productivity. 
 
Before explaining this approach there is a methodological question to answer. 
How well are we able to foretell what these rates of growth might be? There 
exists good reason to be reserved herE, just as there was above. Future 
conditions determining labour demand (ie, conditions derived from economic 
growth and labour productivity) are based on future decisions (especially 
future business and housing investment decisions) of which we are uncertain. 
These decisions themselves are made in conditions of uncertainty, as John 
Maynard Keynes stressed, and the conditions they produce accumulate, one 
upon another, to give future trends. As Keynes's contemporary, the Polish 
economist Michael Kalecki, put it: the macroeconomic long run is something 
of a figment; a series of connected short runs. 
 
Methodologically then it is appropriate to be very sceptical of any certainty 
offered by aggregate forecasts, especially long run aggregate forecasts. Clearly 
doubts exist about the efficacy of inferential econometrics, and the year 2016 
must be placed in the long run category. Nevertheless, while Keynes argued 
against relying on statistical inference from past data in conditions governed 
by uncertainty, he urged instead that we concentrate focus on the reasoned 
grounds we might have for thinking what the future might be. In particular, he 
suggested reasoned analysis of the drivers of short run decision making, 
especially those about business investment. Of course, the recent past will help 
to shape decision making and thereby shape the future, so it must be taken into 
account. So, too, should an understanding of history. However, the lazy 
determinism implicit in relying on statistical inference should be avoided. 
 
The approach below will endeavour to apply these notions. If nothing else the 
foregoing discussion explains why it would be wrong merely to fit regression 
lines to the data, stretch them to 2016 and call the result reliable. 
 
The argument here is that labour demand is a derived form of demand: derived 
from the level of economic growth, which itself is derived from the level of 
aggregate spending, which in turn depends significantly upon the level of 
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business investment and housing spending.10 The task then is to explain how 
economic growth and labour productivity influence the demand for labour. 
 
The relationship accords with the following simple equations (in which the 
asterisk* stands for proportionate growth from year m to year n): 
 
LD* = LDn/LDm 
where: 
LD = Y / (Y/LD) 
 
for any year, and LD is the total labour force demanded (ie, employed), Y is 
the level of output (or GDP) and (Y/LD) is output per person employed (the 
appropriate measure of labour productivity in this context). Therefore: 
 
LD*  = [Yn / (Yn/LDn)] / [Ym / (Ym/LDm)] 
 
    = [Yn/Ym] / [(Yn/LDn) / (Ym/LDm)] 
 
which is to say that: 
 
 L* = Y* / (Y/LD)* 
 
It is also to say that: 
 
LD** ≈ Y** – (Y/LD)** 
 
Where the L** etc, are average proportionate or percentage exponential or 
logarithmic growth rates per annum. These are approximately additive in these 
circumstances.11 
 
Translated into straightforward language this means that the demand for 
labour will rise should the annual rate of economic growth rise by more (or 
fall by less) than the corresponding rise (fall) in the annual growth rate of 
labour productivity (or output per person). The argument prima facie seems 
reasonable, but it is necessary to point out that the above equations are 
identities. That is, by their nature things must turn out this way. What they do 
not contain are the explanations of the mechanisms that caused things to turn 
out the way they did. Moreover what we are interested in are 'future identities', 
 
10 My views on this may be found in the working paper series at the School of Management 
Victoria University site, http://www.business.vu.edu.au/Management/  
11 Note that all items here are 'real'. This means that, though measured in dollars, price effects 
(inflation and deflation) are stripped out. 
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which brings us back to Keynes. We are interested in reasoned grounds, or 
even reasoned probabilities, to suggest why things might turn out as they 
might. 
 
The first step is to examine the most obvious constraint on the growth in 
labour demand: the growth in labour supply. Now the argument must concern 
a statement such as 'what reasonable grounds are there for thinking that labour 
supply will grow in a supposed pattern and at supposed rate?' That case has 
been made and argued above. The ABS labour force projections may be used 
as a reasonable first proxy for labour supply growth. The reason is that they 
depend overwhelmingly on rather more stable population growth factors and, 
to 2016 at least, on the size and shape of the existing labour force. However, a 
caveat was noted above. The ABS might have underestimated the growth in 
female participation to 2016.12 A second caveat is that labour force 
participation rates are sensitive to the health of the economy and generally rise 
and fall directly with the level of economic growth. 
 
Table 6: Economic Growth, Productivity and Labour Force, 
Australia 1995-2002 
 
 
GDP 
(chain volume measure)
Y 
Index 1995 =100 
Labour productivity
Y/LD 
Index 1995 =100 
Employment  
(labour demand)
LD 
(000) 
Labour supply 
LS 
(000) 
Unemployment
U 
(000) 
1995 100.0 100.0 8,256 8,995 739 
1996 104.2 102.8 8,364 9,115 751 
1997 108.2 105.8 8,444 9,204 759 
1998 113.9 109.1 8,618 9,339 721 
1999 119.1 111.7 8,808 9,466 658 
2000 122.5 111.6 9,068 9,678 611 
2001 125.7 113.3 9,157 9,817 660 
2002 130.0 115.4 9,300 9,964 663 
Average 
annual % 
growth 
1995-2002
3.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 n.a. 
% growth 
June 2001-
2002* 
3.8 2.2 2.0 n.a. n.a. 
Sources:  ABS Cat. nos 5206.0, 6202.0 and 6260.0, RBA Bulletin November 2002*. 
 
                                                 
12 It is also possible that the ABS might have erred regarding males, too, by assuming that the 
behaviour of the preceding generation can be used to predict the behaviour of its 
successor (see above). 
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Indeed the data given in the ABS projections for 1998-2002 fall short of the 
actual labour force data for those years. Therefore the actual 1998-2002 data 
appear below. Table 6 represents the data that captures the above equations for 
the years 1995-2002. It is not wise to step too far back in time. The recent past 
is more informative, not least because the structure of the economy before 
then is no longer with us. The recent past is fading, but it is closer. Average 
annual growth rates have been calculated from this data using exponential or 
logarithmic regression. As can be seen the rates are approximately additive 
(and the data are rounded, as well). By comparison with other Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries economic 
growth (3.9 percent pa) has been relatively high,13 as has been the growth in 
labour productivity (2.0 percent pa).  
 
The data in Table 6 correspond to recent figures discussed by the Reserve 
Bank of Australia (RBA). For example, its November 11 'Statement on 
monetary policy' said:  
 
According to the latest national accounts, real output rose by 0.6 percent in 
the June quarter [2002], to be 3 ¾ percent higher than a year earlier… After 
a period of slower growth around the middle of the year, employment 
increased by 0.6 percent in the three months to October, and is now 2.0 
percent higher than the same period last year. Labour productivity growth 
measured on an output per person basis has slowed somewhat from the 
rapid pace recorded in the second half of last year. In the June quarter this 
measure of productivity increased by 0.4 percent, to be 2.2 percent higher 
over the year. (Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, November 2002, pp. 21, 
27-28) 
 
The relevant data are included at the last line of Table 6. The RBA warns of 
two potential problems in sustaining this level of output and productivity 
growth: the effect of the drought and a likely slowdown in housing investment 
spending. 
 
Nonetheless it is reasonable to ask the question: 'what if these levels of growth 
were projected into the future?' My warning is that the answer is something 
more like a thought exercise than a forecast. The relevant effects are those on 
labour demand and labour supply. Chart 11 presents the trends and the labour 
demand data. All the data are given in Table 7, together with the average 
annual growth rates used. The broken line (LS3) represents continued growth 
in labour supply at the 1995-2002 rate, namely at 1.5 percent per annum. It is 
clearly unrealistic. It takes no account of underlying population trends and 
 
13 See eg, any of the Reserve Bank of Australia's (RBA) statements on monetary policy for 
2002. 
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results in a larger labour force in 2016 than there would be in the extreme 
situation in which female and male participation rates were equalised by that 
time. 
 
 
Table 7: Hypothetical Labour Demand and Supply Projections 2002-
2016 
 
 
ABS labour 
force projections 
(ABS LS1) 
Adjusted 
ABS labour 
force projections 
(ABS LS2) 
Labour force 
projections using 
1995-2002 
growth rate 
(LS3) 
Labour demand 
(employment) 
estimate using 
1995-2002 
growth rate 
(LD) 
2002 9,831 9,964 9,964 9,300 
2003 9,935 10,033 10,113 9,470 
2004 10,036 10,103 10,265 9,643 
2005 10,134 10,174 10,419 9,819 
2006 10,230 10,245 10,575 9,999 
2007 10,311 10,316 10,734 10,182 
2008 10,391 10,388 10,895 10,368 
2009 10,466 10,461 11,058 10,557 
2010 10,538 10,534 11,224 10,750 
2011 10,605 10,607 11,392 10,947 
2012 10,657 10,681 11,563 11,147 
2013 10,707 10,756 11,737 11,351 
2014 10,757 10,831 11,913 11,558 
2015 10,803 10,907 12,092 11,769 
2016 10,842 10,983 12,273 11,984 
Average annual  
% growth 1995-2002 0.7 0.7 1.5 1.8 
 
 
However, we have cause to think the ABS projections, represented by the 
square (□) are an underestimate even though they do account for underlying 
population trends. First this series was constructed in 1997, and it 
underestimated labour supply growth to 2002. Second its participation rates 
are likely underestimates for two reasons: (a) a likely underestimation of 
female participation (as discussed above); and (b) an implicit underestimation 
of the effect of the sustained strength of economic growth. The latter is 
implicit because the ABS projections are based on past data going back to 
1978. These data encompass years of low growth and the two most severe 
economic downturns this country has experienced since the depression. Why 
is this important? The reason is that participation rates are sensitive to 
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economic growth (sometimes spoken of as encouraged and discouraged 
worker effects). The adjusted ABS projections, represented by the asterisk (*), 
use the actual 2002 data but the same annual average growth rate as the 
original ABS projections, namely 0.7 percent per annum. The difference 
between the two series is not large. 
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Chart 11: Hypothetical Labour Demand and Supply Projections 2002-
2016 (a) 
 
 
The estimate here for labour demand or employment, represented by the 
unbroken line, is based solely on the projected rate of employment growth 
drawn from the 1995-2002 data, namely 1.8 percent per annum. It prompts us 
to consider the original question directly: will Australia face an aggregate 
labour shortage in future years? If ABS projected rates of labour force growth 
are correct and labour demand continues to grow as it has done in the recent 
past then the prima facie answer is yes. Moreover a labour shortage can exist 
before the LS and LD curves cross (see 2007-08 in Chart 11). In fact some 
industries and sectors of the economy can be said to be facing such shortages 
now. There will also be a certain level of frictional unemployment at any time. 
Unemployment will not drop to zero. 
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Yet that would be to overstate the case. The reason is the variables in the 
simple equations above will adjust. 'Adjust' is an oddly neutral, even 
euphemistic, word. As we know some adjustments can be seamless, and some 
other adjustments can be brutal. Labour productivity is only partly an 
independent or technologically driven factor. Crucially it is itself a function of 
the rate of economic growth. When the economic growth rate is strong labour 
productivity grows in concert both intensively and extensively. Intensive 
growth follows from there being fewer gaps in the average day when demand 
is strong, more work is to be done and work processes are speeded up 
(intensified). Extensive growth – in the case of output per person – comes 
from people working longer hours. Typically paid and unpaid overtime 
increases and part-time workers work more hours or become full timers. The 
average working week lengthens. 
 
If economic growth keeps on pressing the 4 percent per year mark productivity 
is likely to increase. This, in turn, will decrease rate of growth in the demand 
for labour (persons employed). Accompanying this trend of high growth will 
be a greater level of capital intensity of production, especially since business 
investment will have to be sustained at high levels for growth to continue. 
This, too, will increase labour productivity and dampen the increase in the 
demand for labour. Yet it is hard to see this being sufficient if labour supply 
growth is closer to the ABS level than it is to the unrealistic projection into the 
future of the recent past's growth rate of 1.5 percent per annum. Labour supply 
will likely be higher than the ABS projections but not anywhere near the 
unrealistic LS3 in Chart 11. 
 
What if, on the other hand, labour supply reflects a higher level of female 
participation (but still lower than that for males)? Chart 12 shows this as a 
linear increase from the 2002 labour force level to a 11,276,600 labour force 
total projected for 2016 (heavy line with triangle markers). The adjusted ABS 
projection (*) is there for comparison, and the same labour demand as in 
Chart 11 is shown. The result here is clear. Prima facie hypothetical labour 
supplies run out as we approach 2010. Of course, before then the economy 
will have 'adjusted', most likely to lower levels of economic growth. 
 
My answer to the labour shortage question then is this: 
 
1 Yes, at current levels of economic growth, Australia will have labour 
supply problems in the future. 
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2 However, labour supply problems in themselves will 'masked' by 
economic adjustments that will occur before an absolute 'shortage' is 
revealed.  
3 What this will entail for labour supply (and unemployment) is uncertain, 
depending in part on the characteristics of the adjustment process. 
4 Nonetheless both the absolute levels of labour demand (employment) 
and labour supply (labour force) will grow to 2016.  
5 Some sectors of the economy will face more severe problems earlier 
than others, depending in part on their level of labour demand and, 
especially, on their demand for specialised skills. 
6 Others, whose demand for labour will not be as high, will still be able to 
attract the type of labour they require and or encourage retention 
(continued participation) of existing employees provided they are seen 
as 'employers of choice', to use the current buzz phrase. 
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Chart 12: Hypothetical Labour Demand and Supply Projections 2002-
2016 (b) 
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A Postscript on the Role of Immigration 
Before concluding a postscript is necessary on immigration. Immigration is 
too big a subject to consider properly here. Therefore this is only a brief 
summary. Recall that the ABS population projections, on which the labour 
force projections are based, are from so-called Series II. These incorporate low 
net immigration figures of 70,000 per year. The ABS view is that higher 
figures are unlikely. However, they do add that: 
 
Population growth from increased immigration can be achieved by a change 
in government policy. All other things being equal, to achieve a 1.8% 
increase in employment each year, Australia's net overseas migration would 
need to increase from 70,000 per year to 150,000 in the first year of the 
projection, and up to 280,000 a year by 2016. (Labour Force Projections: 
1999-2016, p. 6) 
 
However, imagine that net immigration were increased such that the labour 
force grew by an additional 50,000 in 2002. That initial figure of 50,000 
would increase in each subsequent year by the level of projected economic 
growth used here (3.9 percent). The approach will not attempt to consider 
overall population increases or intakes of migrants each year. The labour 
supply increases here are thus derived results. The results are shown in 
Chart 13. The triangles represent the LS4 projection used in Chart 12, and the 
solid line with square markers and values represents the prima facie effect of 
increased immigration on the size of the labour force. Clearly it would have an 
impact. 
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2016 (c) 
 
 
However, there is a caveat, and it is an important one. Immigration creates its 
own demand. That is, new immigrants' spending has the effect of increasing 
the level of economic activity. The consumer goods and housing sectors, in 
particular, would experience commensurate increases in demand for their 
products. Other things being equal, then, immigration would increase the level 
of economic growth and labour demand pari passu with its effects on labour 
supply. Assuming a multiplier of 1 for convenience, immigrants' spending 
would increase labour demand (employment) to the extent of their own jobs.14 
In other words the solid line representing labour demand would shift upwards. 
 
Yet this caveat contains its own rider. Immigration has longer term effects on 
labour supply by increasing the overall size of the population and the labour 
force. This happens as children of immigrant employees mature to working 
age and new children are born and do the same. Even if immigrant women's 
fertility rates are the same as resident women's, overall population growth will 
 
14 The corollary, of course, is that new immigrants do not take the jobs of residents should the 
economy slow. Rather their spending sustains a higher level of growth than otherwise 
would have been the case. 
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ensure an increased labour supply over time. The words 'over time' are, alas, 
critical. For new children born in Australia the effect will not be felt for a 
minimum of 15 years. This is how immigration has helped to sustain 
economic growth in Australia from the 1950s. Perhaps we are now beginning 
to pay the price for the lower immigration levels of recent times. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The main conclusions of this article are straightforward, even if they go 
against the fashion to exaggerate the 'problem' of social and workforce ageing. 
Certainly the average age of the Australian population is increasing, due to 
lower birth rates and longer life expectancy. There is and will be a greater 
percentage of people in the 60 and 65 plus age groups. Yet it is an error to 
translate this understanding without thought to the workforce. Of course, the 
average age of the labour force is increasing. However, the evidence shows 
that this more the result of the following two factors, namely: 
 
1 the pronounced increases in school age retention and tertiary education 
attendances, which have reduced workforce participation in the younger 
age cohorts; and 
2 increased participation by women in the workforce in all cohorts, but 
especially in the 35-54 years. 
 
This conclusion contradicts the popular assumption that the Australian 
workforce is ageing because the baby boom generation is getting older. The 
evidence also contradicts the received wisdom that there is an epidemic of 
early retirement. These effects may be observed, but they have been 
exaggerated. 
 
Furthermore this article goes against the fashion also by insisting that we do 
not have a 'problem' of workforce ageing. In fact the data show that the 
proportions of the workforce in older age cohorts will not be dramatically 
different than they are now, even when we consider ABS predictions to the 
year 2016. Nor would it constitute a 'problem' even if these proportions rose. 
What we would have is an older workforce that would still be capable. Today 
we have a somewhat older workforce with an increasing female participation. 
The challenge we have is how to craft complex ways of enhancing the 
capabilities of this workforce in the future. Organisations and societies have 
work to be done and given workforces (both actual and potential) with which 
to do it. The question is how best to do it. 
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The issues packaged under the 'older workforce' label are really about 
workforce planning and renewal in changing economies. They are about all 
employees: younger and older. They are about recruitment, training and 
learning and career development; enculturation, transfer of tacit skills, 
knowledge and organisational values; human resources and industrial relations 
systems; and technological and other forms of change. They are about 
organisational culture as a whole: how to transmit, maintain and shape it over 
time. They are about gender, workforce diversity and diversity management. 
 
None of this is to say that some organisations (eg, the public sector) and 
occupations (eg, some trades) do not have age related problems with which 
they must contend (see eg, Worland & Doughney (2002) on the Victorian 
electrical trades). A particular concern arises if they do have an ageing 
workforce profile and a strong tendency towards early retirement. Valuable 
skills and tacit organisational experience may thus evaporate. However, the 
aggregate data do not give compelling support to such a concern for the 
Australian workforce as a whole. 
 
Most important, for what is loosely called 'ageing policy', the data do not 
support arguments for increasing the pension age or the age at which workers 
can gain access to their preserved superannuation entitlements. (Of course, the 
obverse does not hold: there is no good reason to force people to retire or to 
take their preserved entitlements if they do not want to.) If governments want 
to argue for such increases then let them bring forward their real reasons and 
argue solely on those grounds. Those reasons concern the neo-liberal 
ideological obsession with lower government spending and, in particular, 
reduced and/or 'offloaded' welfare spending. 
 
Isn't it so perversely characteristic of neo-liberalism that its proponents should 
beat up a 'problem' – a 'burden', no less – out of the fact, which we should 
celebrate, that people are living longer? Should not we be pleased that people 
are more able to enjoy retirement, work until they are older if they choose and, 
if we devise appropriate mechanisms, engage in a creative mix of leisure, 
family, work and community activity? The latter mix, together with improved 
aged care services, is the real 'ageing' policy challenge our society faces. 
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